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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD R . BLACK, D.D.S. and
PATRICIA ]BLACK,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

)
)
Case No. 14358

VS.

DR. JAMES S. BOYCE,
Defendant and Respondent.

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages brought by the buyers
of corporate stock against the seller for an illegal sale of
the stock which was the subject matter of the buyers1 conditional sales agreement contrary to the provisions in the Uniform
Commercial Code.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court. From a verdict for
the defendant of no cause of action the plaintiffs appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek to have the judgment of the
Trial Court reversed and a new trial granted to determine
plaintiffs1 damages from the wrongful sale of the purchased
stock.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In August, 1961, the plaintiffs and the defendant , together with one, Doctor E. Wayne Allred, purchased
a property fronting on State Street in Orem, Utah.

The

property had formerly been a motel and had an approximate
size of three and one-half acres.

(Tr. 4)

After acquisi-

tion the owners of the property incorporated under the
name of Orem Professional Plaza, Inc. and issued 90
shares of stock, 30 shares to each of them.
lines 7-11)

(Tr. 6

They then transferred all of the property to

the corporation.

(Tr. 14 lines 2-9)

Each of the three

owners established their professional offices in separate
suites in the former motel property.

In 1963 the defend-

ant moved his dental practice to the State of California
(Tr. 6 lines 25-27) and in 1964 negotiated to sell pla'
tiffs his 30 shares of stock in Orem Professional Plaza,
Inc.

(Tr. 6 lines 28-30)

On June 4, 1964, the defendant

forwarded a letter consummating the transaction (ex. 4)
and a letter of resignation (Ex. 5) as officer and director of the corporation.

(Tr. 7 lines 20-25)

No formal

agreement was prepared for the stock purchase, but the
plaintiffs executed a promissory note for $3,343.20 (Ex.
2) (Tr. 8 lines 4-9 and Tr. 8 lines 25-30)

The defendant,

seller of the stock, retained possession of the stock

-2-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

certificates, the parties agreeing by their testimony that the
stock was to be transferred upon completion of payment,
64 lines 3-7 and 23-30)

(Tr.

The plaintiffs made irregular payments

to the defendant on the promissory note through May 13, 1967.
(Ex. 7) (Tr. 9 lines 3-7)

In 1964 four payments were made, in

1965 two payments, two in 1966, and in 1967 three, all of
different and varying amounts.

(Ex. 7)

By February 28, 1967

plaintiffs had made advance payments of $102.02, more than
required by the terms of the promissory note.
1967, they were $45.46 paid in advance.

By May 13,

By July 7, 1967,

according to the terms of the promissory note they were $65.98
in arrears. On July 7, 1967, the defendant claimed to have
sent a letter to the Plaintiff, Richard R. Black, but not
addressed to the Plaintiff, Patricia Black, the other purchaser
(Ex. 8) (Tr. 17 lines 2630, Tr. 18 lines 19-29) The letter was
never received by the plaintiffs.

(Tr. 29 lines 16-21) There-

after, on December 6, 1967, the defendant received a letter
from the plaintiffs (Ex.

6) together with a check for two

installments in the sum of $111.76.
10 lines 2-7)

(Tr. 9 lines 24-30, Tr.

The letter informed the defendant that the

plaintiffs would pay two payments monthly and had sold other
property by which they would soon be able to pay the balance
owing upon the note.

The defendant did not respond to the

letter but banked the payments received with the letter.

On

August 7, 1967, prior to the receipt of the two installments
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and the letter of December 6, 1967, the defendant sold
the 30 shares of stock to the other stockholders of Orem >
Professional Plaza for the then remaining unpaid balance
upon the promissory note.

(Tr. 13 lines 17-21)

No

further notice of any kind was given to the plaintiffs.
No notification was given to the plaintiffs after the
receipt of the two installments and the letter of December
6, 196 7 which informed the plaintiffs of the prior sale
of the stock to the other owners of the Orem Professional
Plaza, Inc.

(Tr. 67 lines 1-10)

After the/ letter of

December 6, 1967 from the plaintiffs to the defendant no
further communication transferred between them.

The

reafter^ the other owners of Orem Professional Plaza
made a demand for rentals and eventually evicted the
plaintiffs from the Professional Offices.

(Ex. 9)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT EXHIBIT
NO. 8, A COPY OF A LETTER ADDRESSED TO ONE
PLAINTIFF BUT NOT RECEIVED BY EITHER PLAINTIFF
CONSTITUTED NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR PAYMENT
The Court, over objections, admitted into
evidence a carbon copy of a letter from the defendant to
the Plaintiff, Richard R. Black, ostensibly mailed on the
7th of July, 1967.

(Ex. 8)

According to the carbon

copy, the letter was addressed to Plaintiff Richard R.
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Black only, mailed to his place of business and not the residence
of the plaintiffs' herein (Ex. 8) (Tr. 18 lines 19-24) and was
not received by him.

(Tr. 29 lines 16-21)

The rules of evidence

provide that a letter which is shown to have been properly
stamped and correctly addressed and deposited in the mail is
presumed by the courts to have been received by the addressee
under due course of transmission by post.

Jones on Evidence,

Chapter 2, Section 60, page 103. However, as quoted in Jones
on Evidence, the presumption is valid only when certain criteria
has been met when, at page 105, it says:
However, there is authority holding that the
presumption does not arise where there is no
actual proof that the letter was placed in the
mail or that the customary practice was
followed.
The Utah Court dealt with this in the Utah case Brown v.
The Fraternal Accident Association of America, 18 Utah 265,
55 Pac 63 (1898) wherein the court said:
Where notice is
raises at least
that the notice
sumption is not

properly sent by mail, it
a prima facie presumption,
was received. This preconclusive.

The Court in a later case dealt more specifically with the
matter and the rebutting of the presumption in Campbell v.
Gowans and Milner, 35 Utah 268, 100 Pac. 397 (1909) wherein
the Court said:
The mailing of a letter postpaid, and properly
addressed to a person shown to reside in a city
or town to which the letter was addressed, creates
no legal presumption, but a presumption or in-
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ference of fact, that it reached its destination.
• • •

The testimony of the witness Milner is therefore
some evidence that the letter testified to by
him wvs received by the Gowanses in the due
course of mail. The defendants, however, testified, that no such letter as testified to by
Milner was received by them. On such question
we think the evidence preponderates in favor
of the defendants. . . . Id. at 284 [emphasis
suppliedj
Thus, the Utah Court has held that the presumption is
overcome by the testimony of the recipient of the letter
that the letter was not received.

This has remained

the rule of law and is the identical circumstance that
is present in the case now before the Court.

The defendant

did not testify that he placed it in the mail, but that
it was picked up by a mailman at his office.
lines 4-10)

(Tr. 19

Plaintiff Richard Black testified that he

never received nor knew of the existence of the letter.
(Tr. 29 lines 16-21)

On the ruling of this Court in

Campbell v. Gowans, the requirement of proof of such
notification was not met.

There was no evidence that it

was done in the usual course of mailing and, in addition,
there was no evidence showing that it had been deposited
in the mail.

The evidence shows that the letter was

addressed to one plaintiff only and was not sent to
their place of residence.
Trust Co.

In the case Walker Bank and

v. First Security Corporation, 9 Utah 2d 215,

341 P.2d 944 (1959), this Court held that the presumption
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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does not occur when a letter, even though mailed in the regular
course of business, was not received when it was not addressed
to where the party was living. As cited in 29 Am Jur 2d 878 at
page 981:
A letter written to a party to a suit is not
admissible in evidence against him if it was
never received by him and has never been
in his possession. (cases cited for this
principle: Smith v. Shoemaker, 17 Wall (US)
630, 21 L Ed 717; Pierce v,"TTerce, 97 Colo
228, 48 P.2d 1024; Wilson v. Mitchell, 48
Colo 454, 111 Pac 21; Purinton v. Purinton,
101 Me 250, 63 A 925; Hedden v. Roberts,
134 Mass 38; Phillips v. Scott, 43 Mo 86)
In the Idaho case Matlock v. Citizen National Bank
of Salmon,

Idaho

, 250 Pac 648, 50 ALR 1418 (1926) the

Court said:
When a letter, properly addressed and stamped,
is deposited in the postoffice, the presumption
arises that such letter arrived in due course
at its destination. However, when the failure
of such a letter to arrive has been established,
there conversely arises the presumption that it
was never mailed.
29 Am Jur 2d 198 at page 251 provides:
Some authority holds that the presumption is
entirely overcome by the uncontradicted testimony of the addressee that the letter was never
received . . .
and cites those courts adhering to such principle as Arkansas,
Colorado and Utah, citing the case of Planters' Mutual Insurance
Co. v.

Green, 72 Ark 305, 80 SW 151; Conklin v. Shaw, 67 Colo

169, 185 Pac. 661; Campbell v. Gowans, 35 Utah 268, 100 Pac 397.
This writer believes that the law in Utah is well
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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is well established that for the admissibility of a
letter as evidence of the notice and demand in a case
the evidence must show that not only was the letter
properly and in the regular course of business mailed,
but that the same was received by the person by whom
such letter or notice was to be given.

Such is not the

case in the matter now before the Court.

Such letter

was not received, not mailed in the usual course of
business, not addressed to both obligors on the debt,
the plaintiffs, and not mailed to their residence address.
On such evidence, the Trial Court should have concluded that
plaintiff did not receive a notice demanding the balance
due on the acceleration of the note as provided by the
option clause in the note.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PLAINTIFFS
BY NOT TENDERING THE BALANCE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE
FOR THE SHARES OF STOCK LOST ALL RIGHTS IN THE
SHARES
The transaction entered into between the
plaintiffs and defendant which gave rise to this action
might be characterized as either an orally agreed conditional sales contract for the purchase of 3 0 shares of
stock in Orem Professional Plaza, or a sale by execution
of a promissory note secured by a pledge of 30 shares
of stock.

(Tr. 8 lines 25-30, Tr. 64 lines 3-7). It is

immaterial whether it is characterized as a conditional
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sales contract of the stock or a sale of the stock coupled
with a promissory note with pledge of stock as security,
since the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted in Utah, does
not differentiate between conditional sales or reservation of
title agreements, but catagorizes and treats all such agreements
as secured transactions.

Section 70A-9-107, Utah Code Annotated,

1953, as amended, reads:
A security interest is a 'purchase
money security interest' to the extent
that it is
(a)

taken or retained by the seller of
the collateral to secure all or part
of its price. . . .

In this action, the requirements of the Statute of
Frauds pertaining to this are met by the admissions of the
parties (Tr. 64 lines 3-7) that this was a sal^ where title
was to pass upon payment.

The Court is cited to 70A-8-319,

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which provides as
follows:
A contract for the sale of securities is
not enforceable by way of action or defense
unless . . .
(d)

the party against whom enforcement
is sought admits in his pleading,
testimony or otherwise in court that
a contract was made for sale of a
stated quantity of described securities
at a defined or stated price.

Thus, we have here a sale of the shares of stock
which are subject to the terms of the Uniform Commercial

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Code (Tr. 8 lines 4-9) and that said security interest
is perfected by the action of the defendant in this
case retaining possession of the collateral.
lines 3-7)

(Tr. 64

Section 70A-9-305, Utah Code Annotated,

1953, as amended, provides:
/

A security interest in . . . instruments,
negotiable documents or chattel paper
may be perfected by the secured party's
taking possession of the collateral. . . .
Both parties to this action are subject to the

terms of the Uniform Commercial Code.

The right of the

secured party to dispose of collateral after default is
given in Section 70A-9-504, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, which reads in part:
(1) A secured party after default may sell,
lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the
collateral in its then condition or following
any commercially reasonable preparation or
processing. . . . [emphasis supplied]
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by
public or private proceedings and may be made
by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other
disposition may be as a unit or in parcels at any
time and place and on any terms but every aspect
of the disposition including the method, manner,
time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable. . . . reasonable notification of the
time and place of any public sale or reasonable
notification of the time after which any private
sale or other intended disposition is to be made
shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor
. . . [Emphasis supplied]
Section 70A-9-504 imposes upon the secured
party the obligation to:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(a)

Provide the debtor notification of the time

after which any private sale or other intended disposition
is to be made; and
(b)

That the sale or disposition of the security

must be commercially reasonable as to the method, manner,
time, place and terms.
Thus, the Uniform Commercial Code places upon the
secured party certain obligations to protect the rights of
the debtor in the collateral even after default.

Section

70A-9-506, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides in
part:
At any time before the secured party has
disposed of collateral or entered into
a contract for its disposition under section
70A-9-504 . . . the debtor . . . may . . .
redeem the collateral by tendering fulfillment
of all obligations secured by the collateral
as well as the expenses reasonably incurred
by the secured party . . .
Such provision provides to the debtor the opportunity to redeem
the collateral and requires that notice be received by the debtor so
that he may have knowledge of his redemption rights, the intended
disposition of the property, and his opportunity to exercise his
right under such section.
Section 70A-9-507, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
provides that the secured party is liable to the debtor, even
though the debtor is in default, if the disposition of the
security does not comply with the criteria for disposition

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter-11Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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imposed upon the secured party by

:^-504 above cited.

Section 7QA-9-507 defines in part:
. . . If the disposition has occurred the
debtor or any person entitled to notification
. . . has a right to recover from the secured
party any loss caused by a failure to comply
with the provisions of this part.
The sale of the security carried out without notification
of the intended disposition is a violation of the above
quoted Section 70A-9-504, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
asmended, and, further, the sale of the security for the then
remaining unpaid balance is not commercially reasonable
where the stock had been sold to the plaintiffs for a
price of Three Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Three and
20/100 Dollars ($3,343.20) three times the amount for
which the security was sold to the subsequent purchaser
from the defendant or One Thousand One Hundred ThirtyTwo and Ne/100 Dollars ($1,132.00)
Tr. 53 lines 25-30)

(Tr. 8 lines 4-9;

Evidence was presented to the

Court of the value of the property at the time of the
purchase of the property (Ex. 1 ) ; of the appreciation
and value of the property which were the only assets
owned by the corporation (Tr. 6 lines 7-21); of the
total outstanding stock being 90 shares (Tr. 6 lines
10-12); and of the value at the time of the sale in
August, 1967, (Tr. 27 line 19 to Tr. 20 line 4) and for
which the plaintiffs brought action for damages for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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violation of their rights as debtors under the Uniform Commercial
Code.

The ruling of the Trial Court did not afford the plaintiffs

the rights given by the Uniform Commercial Code, and forfeited
the Nineteen Hundred Thirty-Nine and 94/100 Dollars ($1,939.93)
paid by plaintiffs on the purchase price.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS
BEING IN DEFAULT UNDER THE PROMISSORY NOTE HAD NO
FURTHER RIGHTS TO ASSERT A CLAIM FOR DAMAGES OR
TO COMPLAIN OF THE SALE OF THE STOCK TO THE SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS.
Fundamental to the law of contracts is well
established law, prevalent both in Utah and in virtually
all jurisdictions, that no cause of action on a contract
can arise before the contract is broken and, that upon
breach of contract, the party not in default has an
election of remedies. As stated in 17 Am Jur 2d 445 at
page 903:
While no cause of action on a contract can arise
before the contract is broken, and, as a general
rule and in the absence of an anticipatory
breach, no cause of action arises until the
time for performance has expired, the law arms
a party with a remedy for breach of contract
by the other party, (citations cited therein)
. . .

As a general rule, upon the breach of a contract
the injured party may, by election, rescind and
recover the value of any performance by him, or
he may stand by the contract and recover the
damages for the breach. Where money is paid on
a contract which is executory on the part of him
who receives the money and he altogether fails
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to fulfill his part of the contract, the injured
party has an electon to either bring an action
on the contract to recover damages for the nonperformance or to consider the contract as rescinded
and recover back the money paid as had and
received to his use, although he may not do both.
In other words, h£ may resort to alternative
remedies calculated to place him in status quo.
. . . The view is taken that where one party
refuses to perform, the other has an election to
sue for damages or to treat the contract as
rescinded and to make a new contract. lemphasis
supplied]
In the case before the Court, upon the claimed
default of the plaintiffs on the purchase of the stock
(the promissory note which is the document evidencing
the purchase of the stock) the defendant had an election
of remedies either to rescind the contract or to sue for
damages for the nonperformance.

The Court should note

that at the time of the alleged default the plaintiffs
had paid sixty percent (60%) ($1,939.94) of the purchase
price on the promissory note.

If the actions by the

defendant in attempting to sell the security are to be
viewed as a rescission of contract, then certain obligations are imposed by the law upon the defendant to make
such rescission. As stated in 17 Am Jur 2d 512:
The very idea of rescinding a contract
implies that what has been parted with
shall be restored on both sides, and hence
the general rule, which is to be reasonably
applied and . . . is that a party who wishes
to rescind a contract must place the opposing
party irTs'tatu quo. An attempted restoration of
the status quo is an essential part of the
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rescission of a contract, and in accordance
with the general rule requiring restoration,
fi Party cannot rescind and at the same time
retain "the considerationf or a. part of the
consideration, received under the contract.
(numerous citations quoted thereunder)
. . • [emphasis supplied]
Where a party to a contract exercises the right
under its terms to cancel it when it has been
partially performed by the other party, he is
required to place the other in statu quo-that is, he must not cancel it so as to affect
injuriously any rights that have already accrued
to the other in its partial execution.
The rule that he who desires to rescind a
contract must restore whatever he has received
under it is one of justice and equity, not of
procedure—o£ substance, not of form—and must
be reasonably construed and "applied. . . .
The purpose of requiring a party rescinding a
contract to restore to the other party everything of value he has received under it is to
make it unnecessary for the party to whom the
restoration should be made to bring an action
to obtain such restoration. (citations quoted
thereunder) lemphasis supplied]
That Utah adheres to such construction on rescission is born out
by the case of Perry v. Woodall, 20 Utah 2d 399, 438 P.2d 813,
where, at page 401, the court said:
The law is well settled that one electing
to rescind a contract must tender b-vck to
the other contracting party whatever property
of value he has received.
Also, Wingets v. Bitters, 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007,
wherein the court said:
In the strict legal or equitable sense, the
term 'rescission1 imports the concept of
completely annulling a contract as if it had
never existed. This includes the idea of
restoring the parties to their former status,
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and the return by each to the other of what
had been received under it,
kaphasis
supplied]
In that case, the party attempting to assert
rescission elected to retain possession of the corporate
assets; in this case, the stock certificates and the
funds received from the plaintiffs in payment on the
contract.

Therefore, defendant did not comply with the

requirements of Utah Law regarding rescission.

The

other alternative for the alleged breach of contract
would be a suit against the plaintiffs for damages for
the breach of the promissory note for the unpaid balance
of the note, together with expenses authorized by the
promissory note.

The actions by the defendant in this

matter complied with neither rescission or damage suit
but, instead, constituted a forfeiture of all rights of
the plaintiffs herein both to the monies they had paid
on the purchase agreement and to the stock, which was
the subject matter of the purchase agreement. As stated
in Winget v. Bitters, supra., wherein the court speaking
of the rule of construction of law said that the contract
should be construed most strictly against the party
drawing the contract (in this case the promissory note)
and "this is especially true as to a forfeiture, which
is enforced only when the terms are clear and unequivocal."
Id.at 235. Without a formalized agreement giving
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authority for a forfeiture of the rights of the plaintiffs
herein, the defendant, by unilateral action and without notice
of acceleration or demand or suit for damages, sought to
forfeit out all rights of the plaintiffs herein to the stock
which had been more than half paid for and which was only in
arrears $65.98, as of the time of the ostensible notice.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS
WERE IN DEFAULT UNDER THE CONTRACT
An examination of the promissory note, which was the
purchase agreement for the stock (Ex. 2) shows that
installments of $55.72 were to be paid commencing July 20,
1964, and each month thereafter.

The defendant testified to the

payments shown on Exhibit No. 7.

(Tr. 9 lines 3-7 and 20-23)

and through May 13, 1967, the plaintiffs had paid $1,939.94.
An examination of the payment record will show that as of
January 25, 1967 the plaintiffs had paid $1,778.43. According
to the payment schedule in the promissory note, by such date
they should have paid $1,727.32, and were, thus, $51.11 paid
in advance.

By February 28, 1967 they were now paid $101.02

in advance.

By May 13, 1967 they were paid $45.46 in advance

of the payments required under the note. As of July 7, 1967,
the date on which the defendant ostensibly demanded the balance,
they were only $65.98 in arrears of the payments provided in
the note.

The record of payments will show that between July
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20, 1964 when the first payment was due and the date of
July 7, 1967, the defendant had accepted payments on a
very irregular basis, sometimes when the plaintiffs were
in arrears and sometimes when the payments were paid in
advance.

The Court is cited to its very recent decision

in Williamson v. Wanlass, Supreme Court No. 14076, decided
January 30, 1976, wherein the Court cited 70A-1-208 on
option to accelerate a promissory note, wherein the
Court said that said section:
[Sjeems to recognize that acceleration is
a harsh remedy which should be allowed only
if he has some reasonable justification for
doing so, such as a good faith belief that
the prospect of payment is impaired.
and required that the debtor under such agreement be
given reasonable notice that the note holder would elect
to accelerate the payments and hold them accountable for
strict performance in view of the past irregularities
acquiesced in by the note holder.

In the case at bar,

the note gives to the holders of the note upon failure
to pay the installments the right at their option to
declare the entire balance due and payable.

Pursuant to

the Wanlass case that must be communicated to the debtors
and a reasonable time given them to comply with it.

In the

case at bar, the notification was not ever communicated
to the plaintiffs, having never received the July 7th
letter.
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Under these circumstances, the defendant never
accelerated the payments, never exercised his option in the
note to declare the balance due, and the conduct of the plaintiffs
in their delay of the next payment until December 6, 1967 was
no different than prior payments accepted by the defendant.
That such harshness of remedy is not sanctioned by this Court
as shown in the Supreme Court Decision in Fullmer v; Blood,
Case No. 14082 decided February 18, 1976 where the Court cites
with approval the general proposition that:
[W]hen a seller accepts late payments which
allow a buyer to believe the forfeiture provision will not be strictly enforced, the
court will not enforce it unless notice is
given and a reasonable time allowed to make
up the delinquencies; and that where the
forfeiture of the amount that has been paid
in would be so inequitable as to be unconscionable the court of equity will refuse
to enforce it.
Another factor having bearing on this matter is
the rule of construction on right to rescind or terminate
being lost by ratification or waiver which is set forth in 17
Am Jur 2d 489 wherein the right to rescind a contract or to
terminate a contract may be lost when the breach has been
waived by the injured party.

At page 961 it states:

The right to forfeit for a breach, given
by a provision of the contract may be
waived by the acceptance of benefits of
the contract after the breach.
The Transcript of the Record in this matter shows that on
December 6, 1967, the plaintiffs herein sent a letter to the
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defendant (Ex. 6) which letter was produced by Defendant
Boyce.

By his Answers to Interrogatoriesr defendant

indicates he received two payments upon the promissory
note with the letter and deposited them to his bank
account.

(Tr. 9 lines 24-30, Tr. 10 lines 1-7, Tr. 12

lines 18-28)

The testimony of the defendant is that the

payments on said check were not honored at the bank.
The testimony of the defendant is that there were
specific monies left in the account to make payment of
said checks and the checks were never returned.

The

testimony of the defendant that when he received the
letter (Ex. 6) accompanied by the checks he did not
notify plaintiffs that he had previously sold their
stock and did not notify plaintiff that he was not
accepting the payments nor that the delay in payment
was not acceptable to him.

Despite these facts, the

defendant accepted the payments, banked them to his
account, made no communication or notice to the plaintiffs
that they were not acceptable and, nevertheless, forfeited
the payments they had heretofore made upon the purchase
agreement. His conduct is not in keeping with the standards
required by this Court in the two recent cases of Williamson
v. Wanlass, and Fullmer v."Blood, cited above and by Jones
v. Thorvaldson, 15 Utah 2d 308, 392 P.2d 43, wherein the
court said:
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We have no disagreement with plaintiffs'
arguments to the effect that forfeitures
are not favored in law; that language
purporting to authorize forfeitures should
be strictly construed; and that where there
is a specification of a particular ground
for forfeiture, it cannot be declared upon
general or merely related defalcations.
In the case at bar, there were no forfeiture provisions
in the agreement, only an option to accelerate in the holder
of the note. Such general provision cannot be the basis for a
forfeiture.
With the record of accepting payments not in strict
conformity to the terms of the promissory note, plaintiffs
were entitled to a notice requiring them to adhere in the
future to strict performance and notification and demand of
balance due, exercising the option to declare the entire balance
due prior to rescission or suit for damages.

To forfeit

their interest in the stock without such notice and opportunity
to respond is a violation of the plaintiffs• rights herein and
is an error committed by the Trial Court.
POINT V
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT IS CONTRARY TO
THE INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM THE EVIDENCE.
Defendant contends that through the subsequent
buyers of the stock the plaintiffs were given a right to
redeem the stock for the then unpaid balance and that the
same was communicated to the plaintiffs in October or November
of 1967.

(Tr. 52 lines 19-27)

The validity of that evidence
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must be measured in light of the circumstances that
existed prior to the commencement of the lawsuit herein
and prior to the dispute arising.

The facts show that

the Allreds occupied one of the suites in the same building
in which the plaintiffs occupied a professional suite (Tr.
5 lines 1-8); that the other buyers occupied a third
suite in the building; and that they all were located in
Orem, Utah.

Mrs. Allred testified that in October or

November, 1967, she notified Dr. Black of his right to
redeem.

(Tr. 47 lines 17-25)

In December, 1967 (ostensibly

after the communication of Mrs. Allred to Dr. Black that
she had the stock and he could redeem it) Dr. Black sent
the letter (Ex. 6) together with two installments to Dr.
Boyce in California/ because he had received a notice of
eviction in November 30, 1967 (Ex. 9) from the corporcition to evict him from the property.
18-21)

(Tr. 25 lines

It is inconceivable that had it been communicated

in October or November, 1967, that the stock was there
in adjoining offices on the same premises and available
for his redemption that in December of 1967 the plaintiff
would have mailed the two payments to California with
the letter assuring Dr. Boyce that the balance would be
forthcoming.

Dr. Boyce banked the two installments

without any communication back to Dr. Black that the
stock had been previously sold to the Allreds and the
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LaGeorge Music Company,

The payment was not forwarded by Dr.

Boyce to the buyers who ostensibly were to allow the redemption
of the shares of stock by Dr. Black.

The actions of Dr. Boyce

in receiving and banking the payments, in not sending notice
to Dr. Black or of communicating to him that the stock had
been previously sold after he received the two payments on
December 6, 1967, compels us to the conclusion that no such
communication of redemption rights was made by Mrs. Allred to
Dr. Black.

Particularly is this important to evaluate in

light of the fact that the property was increasing in value
during that period of time very rapidly because of the rapid
growth in Orem City, and the LaGeorge Music Company people and
the Allreds stood to profit by securing of the Black stock by
payment only of the unpaid balance without regard to its true
value or the original purchase price paid by the plaintiffs
herein.

The Trial Court erred in its ruling in this matter by

presupposing in the memorandum decision that because tender
had not been made by the Blacks for the balance of the purchase
price that they had no further rights in the stock or the sale
to others.
CONCLUSION
On the evidence presented to Court and on the record
as it now stands, there can be no doubt but that on July 7,
1967 the plaintiffs were in arrears in accordance with the
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terms of the promissory note for the purchase of the
30 shares of stock in the amount of $65.98.

Although

they were in arrears, the pattern of payment and acceptance of payments by the defendant over the period from
July, 1964 through July, 1967 had been a waiver of the
strict requirements of monthly installments set forth
in the installment note.

There can be no doubt that had

proper notice been given to the plaintiffs, the defendant
could have elected to rescind the contract by returning
the $1,939.94 previously paid by plaintiffs upon the purchase agreement and retained or sold the stock as he saw
fit.

There can further be no doubt that defendant could

have made an election to bring a claim and suit for damages
for the unpaid balance, together with court costs and attorneys1
fees as provided in the note.

The defendant did not have

the right to forfeit plaintiffs1 payments and sell the stock.
Pursuant to the terms of the Uniform Commercial Code, the
plaintiffs were entitled to notice and to a sale which was
commercially reasonable.

In view of the fact that the stock

certificates had been sold to the plaintiffs in 1964 for
$3,343.00 and the testimony in Court that the property in
1967 was worth approximately $100,000.00, the sale of the
plaintiffs1 stock for $1,13 2.00 was not commercially reasonable.

The plaintiffs were not afforded the right to redeem

the stock nor afforded the notice of the intended sale.
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The

Trial Court improperly included evidence of the ostensible
notice of acceleration and demand for payment despite the
testimony that the same was never received.

Based upon the

authorities cited and the record, plaintiffs respectfully
assert that they are entitled to a reversal and a new trial
to determine the damages that they have suffered by reason
of the wrongful sale of stock by the defendant.
Respectfully submitted,

1fy.

^T^jfO^

M. Dayle Jeffs^of J e | » ^ p d Jeffs
Attorneys for Plaintiffs "and
Appellants
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